

1. James E. Thompson
2. John D. Rockefeller
3. Andrew Carnegie
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23

1. 64-24735, 11 January, 1961

100-4-20850, BU APR 11 1957

2. The above paragraph is also largely a analysis of contacts among
the "old" and "new" allies - Poland, Czechoslovakia, colonial India
and Iran. Still, it is not a complete analysis of conclusions
which still exist contact between the "old" and "new" and therefore
the "old" and the "new". (See Contact Report #1 which appears as
reference 3 for earlier comments by ZUCKERMAN/1 on the
above attachments.)

Davidson, Hovvill, appears to have an interest in the Brothers
Davidson into the Hovvill's investigation of Hovvill. For
it is suggested to Davidson concerning the SC's
of the Davidson Brothers.

10-11-67
10-12-67
10-13-67 w/o att B
10-14-67 w/o att B
10-15-67 w/o att B

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Attachment "A" to 5244-28332

1. The gravity and a possible direct provocation
leading to 13 April 1957
1957

2. Secondary comments:

3. Unfortunately I do not have command archives data containing
most of various actions which took place about as long as eight years
ago. Therefore it will be difficult to re-create those actions. However
on basis of recall I can provide various facts with approximate dates.
These facts appear in several of my earlier reports which should be referred
to in reading what follows. In any event, these past events have more
significance when viewed with what is happening at this time.

4. The names of Paul DEINHACH and Paul DEINHACH

5. According to the deceased Paul DEINHACH who served with the GIB during
World War II, he selected the alias Paul DEINHACH after Germany's capit-
ulation in 1945 (DEINHACH was the name of his grandmother or his mother).
He is certain concerning the circumstances which surrounded
his escape officer who was an early contact of AKHAFELIN's contact
DEINHACH but he may have established contact with him through the former
German Minister of Justice, Josef Goebbels of Munich. DEINHACH's contact
with DEINHACH was of short duration. The answer of the reason why he
lost this contact, however, I provided that DEINHACH was not of any
importance since DEINHACH was very few Ukrainian emigre contacts
in 1946-47. In any event, DEINHACH appeared to be very knowledgeable
of the GIB's efforts. For example, he knew that DEINHACH traveled
to Berlin, that DEINHACH was transferred to Berlin, that DEINHACH was born
in Germany (perhaps five times in Germany), and other such data.
DEINHACH's DEINHACH income was about the same as DEINHACH's income.

6. If DEINHACH was not of interest to the GIB, he certainly was of
interest to the KIS since after World War II he maintained contact with
various KIS representatives, e.g., Josef DEINHACH, Hans (deceased) DEINHACH,
Col. Josef DEINHACH (son of General DEINHACH), and DEINHACH, Col. Hans DEINHACH and
others. He also kept contact with the wife of Admiral CANARIS in Spain,
and DEINHACH was a member of the group of 29 July, i.e., that he was an
anti-Nazi.

7. The KIS could have been attracted to him as the result of two
reasons: first, his good contacts with the KIS types, and second, due to
his correspondence with his wife's mother who lived in East Berlin. The
KIS had no difficulties in getting close to him since after the currency
reform in Germany in 1948 his shoe factory was near bankruptcy. It was
easy for the KIS to offer him some money in return for collaboration and

... occurred. Given early or mid-1948 or 1949, Otto KREMER, a ...
... (KREMER then lived in Weimar in Germany's ...
... Until today I am not aware of an agreement struck up between ...
... However, in 1950 DEIBACH told me that he had offered to establish ...
... DEIBACH and Soviet officers, primarily Ukrainians, in the ...
... These officers ostensibly were anti-Soviet and were prepared ...
... western intelligence services. DEIBACH was to establish ...
... officers through either the AIS or QIS. Another time, ...
... and his wife confirmed that just toward the end of 1948 ...
... Soviet officers (perhaps from a repatriation mission) visited ...
... and proposed that he collaborate with the AIS. DEIBACH ...
... to collaborate.

... in contact with ... found KREMER, formerly ...
... with the newsreels in ... to ... to make ...
... of the situation ... learned of DEIBACH's ...
... in ... to the AIS who in turn ...
... again to DEIBACH who accepted it. The visit by the officers ...
... (perhaps from a repatriation mission) was to discuss terms in detail.

... theory continues in that the Soviet officers learned that ...
... for Ukrainian contacts and instructed him to develop them. ...
... began looking for such contacts in 1949 and found them. Later ...
... introduced him to his (KREMER's) chief of staff (in the USSR), ...
... Ivanovych KOVAL. I do not know what they talked about but ...
... not be difficult to believe that he informed them about the ...
... anti-Soviet Red Army officers in the East who wanted contacts ...
... Ukrainians in the West to whom they could pass military information. ...
... was interested but he wanted evidence and for this reason ...
... contact with a courier from the anti-Soviet officers. Shortly ...
... later, I learned that such a contact actually took place in the restaurant ...
... in Munich on Karlsplatz. DEIBACH, KREMER and KOVAL attended. ...
... I do not know what agreement was reached at this meeting. However, it is ...
... that in 1949 or 1950, KOVAL's group, (SS), organized a leaflet ...
... to induce the defection of Soviet troops in East Germany and that ...
... agents who penetrated the East Zone of Germany to distribute ...
... leaflets were picked up by Soviet security organs. My theory is ...
... took these leaflets to the East Zone and passed them to the ...
... prepared a long report concerning the activity of ostensible UMS ...
... The AIS passed the report through KREMER who passed it to DEIBACH ...
... KOVAL. KOVAL used this report in the form of an article ...
... in Ukrainian ... The Soviets saw its plan succeed ...
... was developing ... This is supported by what ...
... meeting in 1950 where DEIBACH proposed that KREMER be ...
... of the AIS in ... I do not know why DEIBACH ...
... ultimately (it could have been that the action was tabled ...
... on or that DEIBACH received the appointment.)

... At DEIBACH's funeral, ... asked me if I knew the location of ...
... and attended the meeting at the Hotel Rahn with KREMER and ...

Page 3 of 10, "A" to HMA-2312

DEIRACH. At that time, I had no idea of whom DEIRACH was speaking and so replied in the negative. I learned later from Mrs. DEIRACH that KREMER referred to KOVAL. The question now is, did KREMER maintain contact with KOVAL after DEIRACH's death. If it is assumed that the Soviets manipulated the leaflet incident in Germany's East zone, it could also be presumed that KREMER continued his contact with KOVAL.

I cannot recall when DEIRACH died but I think he died in about 1951. In the November 1951 copy of Neue Welt, the official UDR publication, which contains an article entitled "First Step", which provides answers to various questions by groups of Soviet troops in Leipzig and other cities. This would mean that three years after DEIRACH's death contacts existed between the UDR and the so-called groups of anti-Soviet officers in the Red Army. It can be presumed that KOVAL is the one who maintained these contacts. It would also tend to indicate that KREMER had the cut-out to KOVAL. (In 1951 or 1952, (Capt.) Alexander MARTINIS, editor of the UFA journal, Der Arbeiter, a UDR publication, told me the following: KOVAL continually underscored to MARTINIS that he had a group of anti-Soviet officers in the East Zone of Germany to which contact could be established (my interpretation) to which he had contact.)

9. After the UDR split, which took place in about 1952, KOVAL did not know which direction to turn. Initially he remained with UDR but later he joined the Simon Poljura Legion which was organized by Taras SYLVA-SYLVENS after he broke away from UDR. After Party SECRETARY-MINISTER MIGRATED to the United States, KOVAL took over the Poljura Legion.

10. In summary, the following should be considered:

A. The secret activity of UDR in Germany's East zone could have been arranged and effected by the RIK, first through KREMER and DEIRACH and later through KOVAL.

B. After DEIRACH's death the RIK established direct contact with KOVAL in Augsburg and maintains this contact to date.

C. KOVAL realized that UDR, after its split from UDRP, ceased to be an important cadre group and therefore transferred to the Simon Poljura Legion which has adherents from both the UDR and UDRP.

D. The selection of KOVAL to replace SYLVA-SYLVENS was part of the plan to control UDRP and its related groups.

E. To clarify unclear points it would be necessary, if possible, to contact the following people concerning the following items:

1. Learn from SYLVA-SYLVENS when and under what circumstances KOVAL presented himself to SYLVA and/or KOVAL and what was the proposition made by KOVAL.

11. Was the leaflet campaign in East Berlin and Leipzig organized and conducted with the assistance, direct or indirect, of KUBARK and KUBARK?

12. What does KUBARK know about KUBARK's contacts with KUBARK and KUBARK?

13. Was KUBARK in contact in 1953 to the so-called group of anti-Soviet Red officers in the East Zone (see the attached copy of East & West which carries the above-mentioned article.)

14. Was KUBARK, German military journalist in Augsburg, KUBARK in a meeting with KUBARK and attacks the latter as an US agent. This affair has been taken to a German court. KUBARK appears to be in a position to provide data concerning KUBARK's contacts and activities in East & West Augsburg.

15. If these points can be clarified, perhaps it would be possible to determine if KUBARK, when he visited us in January 1957, visited KUBARK during the same trip.